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Abstract. This paper proposes that the healthcare domain can serve as an archetyp-
ical field of research in pervasive computing. We present this area from a techno-
logical perspective, arguing that it provides a wide range of possible applications
of pervasive computing technology. We further recognize that pervasive com-
puting technology is likely to create concerns about the security of healthcare
systems, due to increased data aggregation, ubiquitous access, and increasing de-
pendency on technical solutions. But we also justify why the same technology
can help building more robust, more dependable systems that increase the qual-
ity of healthcare. We identify building blocks that are necessary to achieve this
goal: a pervasive middleware, appropriate handling of exceptional situations, and
dependability assertions for small devices.
1 Introduction
Today, we see Weiser’s vision of ubiquitous computing [38] steadily taking shape.
Small embedded devices (like those that allow us to communicate always and every-
where) have changed the way in which we perceive the world. But the biggest changes
surely still lie ahead. One difficulty of the research in pervasive computing is to esti-
mate and predict what will be the central paradigms, the central applications, the central
technologies that will have the greatest impact. Basically, there are two ways to find an-
swers to this question: On the one hand, researchers build systems and apply them to
experiment with them in sometimes rather artificial and therefore unrealistic application
environments to estimate their usefulness. On the other hand, it has been attempted to
define the paradigms of pervasive computing first and then try to derive useful applica-
tions from that. Many different prototypes, methodologies and concepts have therefore
evolved, often unrelated and incomparable in usefulness. We believe that this is partly
due to the fact that in pervasive computing no prototype application scenario for the
experimentation of pervasive technologies exists which
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– is realistic and easily motivated to the public,
– in which industrial and governmental interests guarantee research support, and
– which is challenging enough to offer a multitude of interesting research questions
to pursue.
This is unsatisfactory since similar prototype problems exist in other research do-
mains, like the well-known robot soccer (Robocup) challenge in artificial intelligence
and robotics [35]. The advantage of such a scenario is that research efforts can be con-
centrated and solutions can be better compared.
This paper has two main goals. The first goal is to present the application of perva-
sive technology in medical and healthcare environments, like the hospital, as a suitable
scenario for research in pervasive computing that satisfies the conditions stated above.
The second goal is to take up some of the research questions from the area of de-
pendable systems, outline and discuss the problems involved, and present some general
architectural solutions in the context of the hospital scenario.
There has been some related work in the areas of healthcare, pervasive comput-
ing and dependability [4, 8, 9, 14, 18, 24, 31, 36], but this work either does not focus on
dependability [8, 9, 14], concentrates on the dependability aspects of a single particu-
lar problem [4], or does not focus on pervasive computing [18, 24, 31, 36]. In contrast,
we give a general dependability analysis of a healthcare system which is built using
pervasive technology.
This paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we outline the general vision of
a healthcare environment enhanced by pervasive computing technology and argue that
this area is ideal to serve as an archetypical field of research in pervasive computing.
Section 3 presents remote monitoring of a patient’s health state—an application made
possible by the combination of new technologies—and discusses its dependability is-
sues. Section 4 deals with the question of how to provide highly available access control
to pervasive devices in a hospital environment. In Section 5, we show that auditing is an
essential instrument for providing dependability assurances in the healthcare domain. It
turns out that the same infrastructure used for auditing purposes also proves useful for
other purposes, especially for process improvement. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Pervasive Computing Technology in a Healthcare Environment
One of the major consequences of pervasive computing is the disappearing computer,
i.e. computing (and communication) power is increasingly embedded into devices and
everyday artifacts. When people interact with these “smart objects”, they might not
be aware of the fact that in the background, data reflecting their current situation and
behavior is collected, exchanged, and processed. This processing is going on, in many
cases, for the benefit of users, but could also be carried out in the interest of other
parties. This gives room to privacy and security concerns. However, in a healthcare
environment, the benefits might easily outweigh the risks. Patients are willing to give
up a big portion of their privacy for the sake of medical treatment, though that must not
lead to disadvantages outside this context.
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In this section we argue that the application of pervasive computing in the hospi-
tal not only contributes to improvements of healthcare, but also leads to a number of
challenging research problems.
2.1 New Diagnostic and Monitoring Methods
Advances in biomedical technology directly contribute to improvements in therapy and
medical treatment. Nanotechnology, for example, has the potential to make treatments
possible, which have been unthinkable before, by injecting autonomous machines into
the human body. These nanomachines, equipped with sensors and communication capa-
bilities, can even transmit valuable information to devices that reside outside the body.
Assuming that a large amount of information is being made available through sen-
sors and monitoring devices, great potential lies in information processing and its link-
ing to other information sources. As an example, consider a hospital where a patient
is constantly monitored, and the findings are linked to diagnostic information. Then, it
would be possible to advise the hospital canteen to prepare special food for this particu-
lar patient, and to adapt the patient’s specific medication according to his current health
condition. In Section 3 we elaborate on the security issues of remote health monitoring.
2.2 Procedural Improvements
According to [24], thousands of patients die each year in hospitals due to (mostly avoid-
able) medical errors, imposing substantial cost on national economy. This study was
performed in the U.S., but similar numbers are likely to apply in other countries. It
is assumed that improving the procedures related to treatment can help prevent many
medical errors (see recommendations at [1]). This clearly indicates that high potential
lies in the application of pervasive computing technology to process improvement.
For example, medication errors are a severe problem in healthcare. In the U.S., such
errors are estimated to account for 7000 deaths annually [16], and are often due to
bad handwriting and similar problems [29]. Such errors could be largely eliminated
through better auditing capabilities, introduced by pervasive computing technology,
such as RFID (cf. Section 5).
Auditing and the availability of location information can also help to improve other
processes within a hospital. Decisions are often based upon information about the phys-
ical location of a person or an object. For example, if a patient gets into a critical con-
dition, the system could locate the patient and the nearest doctor, and call her to the
scene. Location is also a basic feature in detecting context knowledge about entities.
Consider for example a doctor in an operating room; it is very likely that this particular
physician is currently busy and shouldn’t be contacted on matters of low urgency. There
are a large variety of localization systems available [19], varying in location precision,
environmental constraints, infrastructural requirements, and—of high importance in a
hospital—compatibility with other device types (one major issue that might restrict de-
ployment in a hospital is electromagnetic interference with medical devices).
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2.3 Economical Benefit
Pervasive technology allows to have patient data accessible to authorized users at any
time and at any place. Doctors do not need to be accompanied with a large folder of
diagnostic files. All written information as well as X-ray images and other data are ac-
cessible on touchpads in the patient’s rooms, the offices, on handheld devices, through
headsets and wherever else they are needed. This allows working personnel to concen-
trate better on their work.
New technology might improve productivity, but it also introduces costs for deploy-
ment, administration, maintenance, etc. Although healthcare is an area on which people
are willing to spend a significant part of their income, the amount of money that can be
spend on new treatment methods, the benefit of which is mostly marginal, is certainly
limited. We recognize this fact, but taking into account the prospective proliferation of
pervasive computing technology, its cost might as well drop below the level where its
application in the healthcare domain becomes economically attractive.
2.4 Dependability Issues
The areas which have been described above lie at the heart of the operational abilities in
healthcare. Introducing technical equipment into these areas imposes a non-negligible
probability of failure and hence the (possibly life-threatening) danger of not being able
to perform a service when it is needed. Furthermore, patient data which is accessible
in a pervasive way and (f)lying around almost everywhere must be protected to pre-
serve integrity and confidentiality. The dependability issues do not only stem from the
increased scale and complexity of a system consisting of pervasive technology. Some
of the issues, like the difficulty to define and protect the borders of a pervasive system
or the confusion caused by a malfunctioning system which is an unnoticeable part of
the environment, are a direct implication of the “pervasiveness”. Access control is a
particular aspect in this context. We will discuss the issue of pervasive access control in
section 4.
3 Remote Health Monitoring
In this section, we look at an example of what can be called typical pervasive comput-
ing technology applied to the problem of monitoring medical sensor data that is col-
lected from the patient in real-time. Such systems are being developed for monitoring
a variety of vital parameters, often based on standard computing and communication
technology [14, 31]. The ultimate health monitoring device would be a tiny sensor, im-
planted in the patient, equipped with a ever-lasting battery, and communicating directly
to a responsible physician. Today’s systems consist of tiny implanted sensors commu-
nicating to intermediary devices that are typically attached to the patient’s clothing. An
intermediary device collects data from the sensor and transmits it to a medical center,
using public (UMTS) and private (WLAN) communication infrastructure. Processing
the data at the medical center may result in simply logging it (for future reviews), giving
feedback to the patient (about his current status, not only in critical situations, possibly
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annotated by a physician), or triggering an alarm, directing an emergency team to the
patient.
Messages from the medical center to the patient may also result in configurational
adjustments of the intermediary device or the sensor itself. This could be used, e.g.,
to increase the frequency of data transmissions in more critical situations, or switch-
ing from batch transmissions to real-time transmissions if the physician considers it
necessary. The intermediary device could also act as a relay station for other devices,
such as a “smart pillbox” that offers the patient an optimal dose of medication [8]. This
results in a feedback loop which is vulnerable to interferences and attacks. For exam-
ple, slightly inaccurate measurements could result in different doses that may harm the
patient. Therefore, this feedback loop must be protected against outside manipulations.
The collected data itself, or data about medication, must be considered sensitive, and
its confidentiality must be ensured. Otherwise, conclusions about the patient’s health
state could be drawn. The protection of medical information in our context is mainly a
task of the “background” system, where data is stored, processed, and made available to
clinicians. Access control policies for such systems should follow the guidelines given
in [4, 18]. A monitoring system has different requirements, though.
Who might be interested in attacking such a system? After all, since no written
records are created by default, an attack has to be carried out on a technical level. We
imagine the following scenarios. A greedy relative might want to find out about the
health state of an elderly patient, and even try to change the medication in a way that
shortens the patient’s life time. Or, a competitor of the system’s manufacturer might
try to render the system useless by executing extensive denial-of-service attacks on the
equipment, hoping to persuade patients and physicians to switch to their own product.
If data can be easily extracted from the system, these attacks might be feasible. The rest
of this section shows which parts of a monitoring system are especially vulnerable.
3.1 Basic Requirements
In applications where the timely delivery and processing of sensor data is crucial, the
communication link between an intermediary device and the medical center must offer
a high degree of availability and quality of data transmissions. This could be achieved
by using redundant, diversified technologies, such as 802.11 and UMTS. However, if
neither of them is available, at least the patient and the medical center should be notified
about the failure. Note that the use of public infrastructures, such as UMTS and public
WLAN access points, makes it harder for denial-of-service attacks to stay undetected,
since the common incentive to keep these infrastructures available is higher than for
proprietary infrastructures.
Availability of the background system is essential in order to provide timely feed-
back to the patient. This imposes strict requirements regarding robustness and scalabil-
ity on that part of the system.
Auditing capabilities (cf. Section 5) are of utmost importance whenever messages
result in changes to the sensing equipment. All changes must be accountable to some
system decision, either made by an autonomous process, or by a clinician. In the end,
somebody must take responsibility for the messages being sent. Otherwise, failures due
to system errors become more likely. This means that some (life critical) messages can
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only be sent when authorized by a responsible clinician. The full authorization informa-
tion must be transmitted to the patient device, which should keep an independent log,
making it impossible for the clinician to deny his decision.
Usability is a crucial feature for equipment that is handled by the patient.
The following paragraphs describe some basic issues in providing fundamental se-
curity features of medical systems: confidentiality, integrity, availability, and account-
ability. We will not further go into details of other requirements, such as safety. We
assume that all medical devices are designed and built according to established safety
engineering principles and that (partial) system failure cannot result in severe harm to
the patient.
3.2 Capturing Sensitive Data
The confidentiality of medical data is compromised if an unauthorized person gets hold
of it in clear text. In the simple model of remote health monitoring we present here,
there are many possible attack points where sensitive data could be acquired. They
differ in costs, and it turns out that, for this attack, the most vulnerable part is the
(implanted) sensor itself, because it is the (computationally) weakest device involved in
the monitoring process.
Capturing transmitted data over a public wireless network may be technically sim-
ple. Legislation in many countries requires that law enforcement agencies are able to
intercept messages in the clear. But the weakening of security mechanisms to allow
this also enables attackers to acquire the same messages. Therefore, public wireless
networks should only be used if end-to-end confidentiality of data is ensured. Today’s
computing capabilities should allow for sufficient encryption of sensitive data on the
intermediate device before it is transmitted to the background system. However, then
key management becomes a crucial issue. When the device is handed over to the patient,
a secret shared by the device and the background system can be stored on the device.
This secret could be used to derive encryption keys for data transmissions. The shared
secret must be sufficiently protected in order to deter attackers. On the intermediary
device, a smart card token could be used for this purpose. In the background system, a
(expensive) highly protected system area is required.
If an attacker is able to place a receiver very close to the victim patient, it might be
possible for him to acquire sensitive data directly from the implanted sensor. It is un-
likely that sensors will be equipped with sufficient computing power to perform crypto-
graphic functions. Whatever the computing power of a sensor might be, it will be most
likely spent on sensing tasks instead of (most of the time unnecessary) cryptographic
functions. The best countermeasure against this kind of attacks might be the use of
proprietary transmission techniques, but as such devices become more widespread, it
gets cheaper for attackers to acquire these. Besides, insiders could be bribed to reveal
technical details of the technology, allowing attackers to build their own receivers.
A similar attack is stealing the intermediary device after it has collected (and has
still stored) sensor data. If the intermediary device is designed in a way that makes
(physical) tampering obvious, the damage could be contained, since only a (small) sub-
set of sensor data might be compromised, and the patient wouldn’t reuse the device. But
since such a device will most likely be equipped with a maintenance interface (wired
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or wireless), this API forms a potential vulnerability. In this case, an audit record of the
maintenance access, that is also transmitted to the monitoring center, might reveal the
unauthorized reading of the data. Note that shutting off the sensor or the intermediary
device completely against potentially unauthorized access might hinder access in emer-
gency cases. It is not obvious how to distinguish a malicious access from an access in
case of an emergency.
3.3 Manipulating Data
The manipulation of data in a health care system could have a fatal impact, therefore
the integrity of data is of major importance. That means that at all places where data is
kept or in transit, its integrity must be protected.
Sensors measure data and run it through a (simple) processing step. The output of
this step is regarded as the original data. For auditing purposes, it is required that this
data is stored in the audit log in its original form. Intermediate processing steps must
not alter the original data, since only the original data can be ultimately attributed to the
sensor.
The authenticity of sensor data cannot be certified directly by the sensor itself, due
to computational restrictions. However, the intermediary device can keep record logs of
incoming sensor data, and certify the findings on its own behalf. This makes it techni-
cally impossible to firmly attribute data to the sensor, but by the use of certain means,
the trust in the authenticity of the data can be increased. Such means might include
checks on the plausibility of sensor findings (if disproportionate values are received,
the medical center is able to detect a fault), the use of redundant intermediate devices,
and regular synchronization with other measurements.
A sensor receiving a control message, e.g. to change its configuration, must make
sure that the message is originating from an authorized process and is being delivered
when it should be. Again, due to likely restricted computing capabilities within a sensor,
the sensor might not be able to verify the authenticity of a message by itself. It relies on
the intermediate device to do so. In contrast to the collection and transmission of sensor
data, which can be done by a bunch of different devices, controlling the sensor should
be reserved for a special, trusted device. Such a device can verify the authenticity of
messages. Explicitly requiring the patient to use a certain device makes sure that the
patient is aware of the change.
3.4 Denial of Service
A system fault or an attack resulting in denial-of-service (DoS) is perceived by the
patient as the intermediary device reporting constantly its inability to receive acknowl-
edgements for its data transmissions. The device might be able to send its data, but
it has no way making sure that the data is received. The patient might call the medical
center on the issue, and if the center reports that the data was received, the patient might
manually acknowledge the receipt. However, if the medical center does not receive any
data, it will inform the patient about it. The audit logs should then enable the security
officer to trace down the system fault.
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There are many possibilities of performing a DoS attack on a weakly protected
monitoring system. Transmission links can be jammed, batteries within the sensor and
the intermediary device be drained, the communication interfaces of the medical center
could be overloaded (e.g., by a conventional DoS attack in the Internet), computation-
ally intensive processes be injected in the center’s processing plants.
3.5 Impersonation and Insiders
An attacker might trick a patient into handing him his monitoring equipment by pre-
tending to be a technician or a physician. This is similar to “ordinary” criminals who
enter a victim’s household under false allegations, stealing valuables or robbing the
victim on his own grounds. The attacker might exchange devices with fakes, or install
additional equipment for surveillance. As we have already seen, the sensors will most
likely not be equipped with sophisticated cryptographic mechanisms, so this is a feasi-
ble way of getting sensor data. This problem can be (partially) solved on a higher level
through patient awareness. In principle however, there is no technical way of preventing
an attacker from acquiring the patient’s trust. It is noteworthy that, in companies, most
security relevant attacks leading to damage are executed by insiders, who misuse trust
laid in them by the victim.
3.6 Emergencies
A typical difficulty in securing medical devices is the requirement of override proce-
dures for emergencies. Everybody knows situations where “regular” procedures, con-
sidered safe under ordinary circumstances, threaten to do more harm than benefit, and
must be replaced by unusual, possibly dangerous actions. As a rule, formulated in [18],
a responsible person must always be able to switch off all security mechanisms and
act as he considers appropriate in case of an emergency. The change of the system into
emergency mode has to be recorded for future review. Penalties act as a deterrent to
abuse of this mechanism.
What does that mean for pervasive computing in healthcare? Suppose a number of
devices, invisibly performing their tasks for the benefit of the patient. Patient and physi-
cians might not even be aware of them. However, they must be able to shut them down,
or switch to emergency mode, immediately and completely. Assuming that devices can-
not detect emergency modes by themselves, there must exist external means to perform
this operation. One feasible solution could be a special device, carried by medical per-
sonnel, which is able to switch all surrounding devices into emergency mode.
4 Dependable Access Control
Pervasive computing technologies allow accessing confidential patient data always and
everywhere. This information must be protected from unauthorized access and modifi-
cation. In this section we present the design of a highly available access control service.
It is similar to the well-known Kerberos system [30], but tailored for a pervasive envi-
ronment with some degree of fixed infrastructure. In this section, a hospital will serve
as example deployment area.
8
4.1 Dependability Architecture
The electronic equivalent to a patient’s medical record on paper is a dedicated database
which we see at the center of any system in the hospital environment. Usually, hospitals
and other healthcare institutions already have large commercial databases installed, but
the mechanism to access this data (based on passwords) is usually not flexible enough
to be useful in a pervasive environment. Hence, a central design decision is to separate
the management of data from the mechanism to control access to it.
An access control mechanism contains data itself, namely the information of whom
to grant access to what. We assume that the mapping from users to objects that defines
the access control is given by the security policy of the institution which runs the system.
Usually, this is based on a role- and location-based access control mechanism [6]. A user
is associated with a digital identity that he carries with him and can be communicated
to the access control system. Using a common challenge-response protocol [28], the
system can validate the identity of the person and on success return a digital certificate
which enables the access. The challenge is now to ensure the availability and integrity
requirements of the service.
To ensure availability, access control data has to be replicated at points which are
assumed to fail independently [11]. The infrastructure must provide for a set of access
control servers, which are distributed in the area of the institution. These servers must
be physically protected and surveilled. Interaction with the service is performed at cer-
tain identifiable access points. These may be touch-screens, doors, handhelds or other
small devices at a specific location. The distribution of servers and communication fa-
cilities must ensure that from every access points, a certain number k of access control
servers are reachable. Usually, k will be some number larger than 2. Since k is intu-
itively a measure of the dependability of the system, the value of k should be chosen as
large as possible given the institutional (financial) and locational (area layout) restric-
tions. It is possible to vary this number according to the security requirements in certain
areas of the hospital. For example, k should be at least 3 for access points in publicly
accessible areas. In highly sensitive areas where physical access is already limited (like
an administration building or an intensive care unit), k = 2 or even k = 1 should be
sufficient (see figure 1).
The underlying concepts of the access control mechanism rely on a combination of
two established mechanisms: agreement protocols and secret sharing. The idea is that
in order to grant access to a certain resource, the k access servers in the vicinity of the
access point query their access control database and form an agreement on whether or
not to grant the access. If they decide to allow access and a subsequent main database
query (for patient data) is necessary, the involved servers will jointly calculate a cer-
tificate which is made available at the access point for further actions. Otherwise the
response may simply be the opening of a door or the activation of a signal on a naviga-
tion display.
The agreement is reached using an agreement protocol for the Byzantine failure
model [25]. In the current setting, theoretical investigations show that at least 3 distinct
nodes are needed to tolerate at most one Byzantine process. However, in many cases
where the faults are not so malicious, 2 servers or even one are sufficient. Note that
reaching agreement using optimistic Byzantine agreement protocols [15] is practical
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access control server
access point with k=3
access point with k<3
Fig. 1. Sample layout of access points and their connection to access servers.
today. The assumption that access servers may be stolen or completely compromised
implies that for k ≥ 2 no single server may contain enough information to derive and
produce valid certificates. This is achieved through standard secret sharing approaches
[33]. In these approaches, a secret key is distributed across a set of nodes in such a way
that only a certain fraction together is able to compute the secret again. In the case of
k = 3, at least two servers are need to be fully compromised to be able to derive secret
key information.
4.2 Summary
The above architecture is highly distributed. Access points for which the necessary ac-
cess servers are still available can operate autonomously. In case where even this num-
ber of servers is unavailable, access points must provide for manual override mecha-
nisms in case of emergencies. These override mechanisms contain devices that allow
to log the required data for later audit or raise an alarm. An advantage of the architec-
ture is that it is simple, it exploits the connectivity available to pervasive devices, and
it allows to embed the resources necessary to do cryptographic computations into the
environment, thus relieving small devices (like the access points) from such heavy duty
tasks.
5 Auditing
Auditing in general can be characterized as the accumulation and evaluation of evidence
about information to determine and report on the degree of correspondence between the
information and established criteria [3, 5].
With a pervasive computing infrastructure in place, it becomes feasible to run a
fully computerized electronic 24h accounting process: The ubiquitous infrastructure
has means to uniquely sense and identify objects within the hospital. Furthermore, it is
providing the technical means for pervasive access to all information and services. Thus
the infrastructure is holding a key position: First, it is able to keep a complete record
of all objects that are used or accessed in the hospital. Second, it is in a position to log
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all services and data transactions that are carried out. In addition, such an infrastructure
may operate during day and night and analyze the continuously collected data in real-
time.
In the following, we will sketch a potential pervasive security auditing service in
the hospital environment and describe its basic requirements. Further, we will demon-
strate that such an auditing service has favourable side-effects which can contribute
to increase the safety and efficiency of health care and business processes within the
hospital.
5.1 Security Auditing
As a rule, health care services have to comply with established national standards and
legislation of the respective countries. For example, in the United States, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [20, 32] defines standards for
electronic health care transactions and data exchange. It also addresses the security and
privacy of health data.
However, in a hospital transformed by pervasive computing technology, it is impos-
sible to verify that its operation satisfies established standards and legal requirements if
no data on processes and events is accumulated. Therefore, in order to enforce a security
policy in the hospital environment, it is required that all security related data is recorded
during operation. The task of analyzing the collected data can then be delegated to an
automated security auditing process as described above. This process should then cover
all data and information that is relevant to security in the hospital.
In general, whenever a device or a user is authorized to perform a certain task, this
event should be liable to supervision and security auditing. Also, whenever standard
procedures or regulations are violated, these incidents should be recorded, too. This
includes the case of emergencies, e.g. when restrictions are rightfully countermanded in
order to avert damage to patient life. In the following paragraphs we give some concrete
examples for processes and events that are relevant to security auditing in the hospital
environment:
Access control mechanisms in the hospital require means to authenticate and autho-
rize users and devices. For example, this is the case in the following situations:
– Doctors are authorized to have ubiquitous access to medical patient records of their
patients only. They may read or edit these records according to the provided medical
treatment.
– Patients are equipped with devices for remote monitoring and diagnostics. These
devices may be adjusted during operation, either automatically by a medical system
or manually by authorized medical staff.
– Pervasive access control is operational throughout the hospital: Doctors, patients,
and visitors automatically gain access solely to those areas and rooms which they
are authorized to enter.
For safety reasons, there are means to countermand the various access restrictions
in the case of an emergency. For example, to activate an emergency override may be
legitimate in the following situations:
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– If a clinical emergency occurs, doctors may be required to read records of patients
other than their own. For example, if a patient monitoring device detects a critical
anomaly in the patient’s health condition, the nearest doctor and not the physician
who has been initially assigned to the patient is called to assist.
– In the case of a fire alarm, patients or hospital staff have the right to open doors and
enter rooms that normally are off-limits.
– Medical devices that detect technical problems or malfunctions, e.g. due to low
battery level or signal interference, call a technician or hospital staff for trouble-
shooting. If the functioning of a device is vital to the patient’s health, a doctor may
have to change its configuration or programming even though he does not possess
the necessary permissions.
The situations described above should all be covered by a security auditing mechanism
in the hospital.
5.2 Dependability Issues
As it is the case with any technical infrastructure, a security auditing mechanism in the
hospital, too, is subject to service disruption and unauthorized manipulation attempts.
On the one hand, it is therefore necessary to protect the network and computer
equipment against a variety of traditional attacks, including denial of service attacks,
hacking, the introduction of Trojan horses, etc. The security auditing service will there-
fore have to include “classic” security auditing features [26, 37] such as intrusion de-
tection [2, 13] or a firewall [34]. In particular, to protect a heterogeneous and highly
distributed pervasive computing infrastructure, the security mechanisms have to give
special attention to its physical distributedness. For instance, in the pervasive hospital,
a distributed intrusion detection system [10] is required to cope with distributed attacks.
On the other hand, the quality of a security audit heavily relies on the composition
of the collected data, especially its integrity, confidentiality, authenticity, completeness,
and quality: First, it must be ensured that the auditing is performed according to well
defined rules and regulations, and that it is tamper proof against manipulation attempts
on behalf of malicious third parties. This calls for security mechanisms that protect the
integrity and confidentiality of data used for auditing. For example, confidential sensor
data should be encrypted and transmitted over secure channels only. It should be impos-
sible to forge data that is collected by the auditing service. Neither should the content of
the data be revealed during the process of data collection, e.g. to prevent eavesdropping
and to protect the privacy of patients. Second, it must be possible to associate collected
data with the originating sources (sensors). For the sake of credibility and authenticity,
only data from authenticated and trusted sources should be considered for the audit-
ing process. This could be achieved by introducing a local public key infrastructure
and digitally signing available data at its source. Third, the infrastructure service that
is performing the auditing has to function according to the specification at all times,
that is even in the presence of transient disturbances and component failures. For ex-
ample, if the occurrence of an emergency condition is not duly recorded, a doctor may
be reprimanded for taking actions that exceed his authorisations even though he right-
fully overrides applicable regulations in order to save the life of a patient. Therefore
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the auditing infrastructure needs to support fault tolerance and meet stringent avail-
ability requirements to achieve the highest possible level of completeness of data. This
includes support for disconnected operation [23] to handle states of transient discon-
nectivity. For example, distributed sensors might have to buffer data during intermittent
unavailability of (wireless) network connectivity. Last but not least, the quality of the
accumulated data is depending on various factors: For instance, the number of sensors
that are placed in the infrastructure and the density of their distribution determine the
granularity and accuracy of a positioning service. However, inaccurate position infor-
mation is again counterproductive to location based services such as automated access
control or smart notification. So low data quality must not lead to wrong conclusions
when analysed by the auditing process.
Further issues are the robustness and scalability of the security auditing infrastruc-
ture. In the first place, the auditing facilities in different sections of the hospital should
work independently. For example, if there’s a fire on one floor of a building, the auditing
mechanisms on other floors should not be affected. This requires a form of decentral-
ized management. The robustness of a decentralized auditing infrastructure may benefit
from results in the in the research fields of self-organization and self-stabilization. Con-
cerning scalability, a security auditing mechanism as described has to cover a great
number of mobile or highly distributed devices and objects. However, this aspect is
closely related to the scalability of pervasive computing systems in general and not
specific to auditing.
5.3 Safety and Efficiency
In this section we will demonstrate in which way a generalized, fully automated au-
diting process can contribute considerably to the safety, efficiency and effectiveness of
processes in the hospital environment.
Safety. As mentioned above, medication errors constitute a severe problem in hospitals
(cf. section 2.2). In this context, many healthcare IT professionals believe the best way
to address the medical errors issue head-on is to install robust information systems that
help physicians make the right decisions at the right time for the right patients [36].
Now, pervasive computing may contribute noticeably to increase the safety of health
care processes. A fully automated real-time auditing mechanism is the basis for on-the-
fly surveillance and validation of health care processes. The accumulated, persistently
stored data may provide insightful evidence for a later evaluation of emergency in-
cidents, too. Concerning the technical realization, all trays, meals, pill boxes etc. in
the hospital may be tagged, e.g. using RFID technology. Antennas mounted in various
places in the hospital – inside the patient’s bedside table, for instance – are then in a
position to identify all objects that appear nearby. This information is then recorded by
the auditing mechanism, which in turn makes this data available to other applications.
A real-time 24h safety protection service could then evaluate and analyse the safety
relevant data, thus performing a safety audit. The result of the safety audit may be the
sending of a notification message, the triggering of an alarm, or the activation of certain
13
emergency procedures. Such a safety audit may improve the safety of health care pro-
cesses by (1) validating allotment processes, (2) detecting incompatibilities in patient
treatment, and (3) surveilling the adherence to safety regulations:
First, the safety auditing mechanism may help to to validate that drugs, infusions or
meals are not confused during their allotment. So if trays actually have been confused
and a patient does not receive the proper medication, both the patient and/or medical
staff will be alarmed the moment the wrong tray is laid onto the patient’s bedside desk.
Second, if a patient requires a certain medication or infusion, e.g. during an emer-
gency, the safety auditing service automatically verifies that a prescribed drug or infu-
sion does not conflict with the patient’s medical history or with other drugs he takes.
Also, a patient who wears a cardiac pacemaker or has metal screws inside his body, e.g.
due to an earlier operation of a fracture, should not undergo a nuclear spin tomography
(MRI); the enormous magnetic field might interfere with his implant or the metal in
his body in a very unfavorable way, possibly leading to severe injuries or death of the
patient. But on entering the antechamber of the tomograph, the safety auditing service
can identify the patient and recognize the incompatible treatment. As a consequence,
an alarm bell is triggered and both the patient and the doctor are warned about the
imminent health risk.
Third, operations on the wrong patient or foreign objects left in patients’ bodies af-
ter surgery are common problems in hospitals [36]. Now, a safety auditing mechanism
helps to prevent cases of incidental medical malpractice. For example, a smart op-box
that knows the whereabouts of medical equipment – including pliers and perishable
objects such as pads and bandages – may closely monitor the usage of tools and equip-
ment during surgery. It may tell the surgeon which items are still in the box, have been
disbanded in the waste basket or are still in use. Thus the surgeon knows at all times
whether there are still pieces of medical equipment missing and potentially left in the
patient, or if all the equipment has been safely removed. Generally, by making use of
identification and localisation capabilities, the auditing mechanism may also be used to
verify that the right patient turns up at the right place and gets the right treatment.
Efficiency and Effectiveness. In the hospital domain, computer-based information sys-
tems have become common today, covering both administrative as well as medical func-
tions. The Healthcare Informatics magazine, for instance, keeps a record of healthcare
management and information systems that have been installed in the recent years [21].
However, in general, these systems share the lack of full automation. They have to be
operated manually by hospital personnel, e.g. by using (mobile) computer terminals to
enter new data.
A pervasive computing infrastructure, in contrast, allows pervasive information ac-
cess and automatic data collection, which has been recognized to improve the effective-
ness and efficiency of patient care [9]. The accumulation of data provides full coverage
regarding space (all buildings, objects, people) and time. Furthermore, it enables both
an immediate and time decoupled (asynchronous) analysis and availability of the col-
lected data: certain data may trigger actions the very moment it has been recorded.
These capabilities allow to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of patient treat-
ment [17], facility management [7, 22], supply chain management [27], and accounting
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and billing. For example, in hospitals it is commonplace that doctors and other medi-
cal staff spend many hours after their usual shifts to write diagnoses into patient’s files
and register the performed treatment with the electronic accounting system, so that the
corresponding health insurance company may be billed. With a pervasive auditing in-
frastructure in place, these tasks can be automated to a large extent. The time a patient
spends in certain diagnostic and therapeutic environments, e.g. physiotherapy, massage,
X-ray examination, computer tomography, etc., can be captured implicitly during the
day. This may be achieved by analyzing the location of a patient, the prescriptions he
received and the medical records that have been accessed by the physician.
5.4 Summary
A pervasive computing infrastructure is particularly suited to provide a fully automated
security auditing service. Still, there are a number of dependability issues that have to
be resolved before we can fully exploit the potential benefits of an automated auditing
process in the hospital environment. Further, it has been described how a pervasive
auditing mechanism can also contribute to increase the safety and efficiency of health
care and business processes within the hospital.
Finally we wish to sound a cautious note, too, because the existence of a safety pro-
tecting service may lead to a false sense of safety. While it may provide some additional
means to improve the safety within the hospital, it cannot guarantee to do so absolutely,
at all times and under all circumstances. The ultimate responsibility, control and fi-
nal judgement still must remain in the hands of health care personnel. Possible social
implications of pervasive computing technology in the hospital environment will need
closer examination, too. For further information on potential real-world implications of
pervasive computing, see [12].
6 Conclusion: A Research Agenda
Apart from promoting healthcare as an application scenario, the technical part of this
paper has raised a number of questions which we group and summarize in the following
fundamental agenda for research:
– Pervasive middleware: In a general application setting of pervasive technology like
a hospital, developers must decide which parts of the solutions should work in
isolation and which parts can be delegated to a basic infrastructure. How could such
a pervasive middleware incorporate services that satisfy the demands of domain-
specific applications like remote monitoring and auditing.
– Secure degradation: The problem of dealing with emergency situations is obvious
in the healthcare domain. This does not only refer to override mechanisms for ac-
cess control, but also to fail-safe design of pervasive health monitoring and health
control devices. How can pervasive technology be designed to maintain security
and a basic service both in normal and emergency situations? What rules of thumb
exist for the design of “secure or reliable degradation”?
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– Hierarchy of devices and properties: There will always be devices which are so
small so that they cannot ensure an arbitrary level of dependability (e.g. sensors
with small batteries and no cryptographic functionality). Is there a way to group
or classify pervasive devices into a hierarchy of dependability properties, such that
requirements can be stated more easily? For example, auditing requires to maintain
a minimal level of trustworthiness and authenticity of sensor data. Can the class of
devices that fulfill this requirement be exactly specified?
We wish to further investigate these issues and motivate researchers to perform work in
this area.
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